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THE CHINESE WALL DEFENSE TO LAW-FIRM
DISQUALIFICATION
American law firms have grown to unprecedented size by
branching, merging, and expanding internally.1 This growth has
inevitably magnified the potential for intrafirm conflicts of interest.
As a firm increases in size, and the number of its lawyers and past
and present clients grows, there is a greater likelihood that prospec-
tive clients will have interests adverse to those of other clients, both
current and former.2  In these circumstances, representation may
lead to disqualification based on a lawyer's duties to protect a client's
confidences and secrets,3 to serve a client with undivided loyalty,4
and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.5 If an ethical
conflict is found sufficient to disqualify an individual attorney, then,
under traditional rules, the disqualification may extend to the en-
tire firm with which he or she is associated.0 In particular, con-
fidences and secrets obtained by a single attorney in an adverse
1 As of October, 1979, there were 11 American law firns with more than 200
attorneys, and 38 firms with more than 150 attorneys. National Law Firm Survey,
Nat'l L.J., Oct 1, 1979, at 28-33 [hereinafter cited as Survey]. See Cantor, Law
Firms Are Getting Bigger... and More Complex, 64 A.B.A.J. 215, 215-19 (1978);
Bodine, Mammoth Firm Keeps Steamrolling, Natl L.J., Aug. 13, 1979, at 1, col. 4;
Lewin, Law Firms Branch Out, Go National, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
2 "The risk of conflict rises exponentially with the size of the firm .... ."
G. HAZARD, ETmcs IN Tim PRAcTicz or LAw 81 (1978); see Note, Unchanging
Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest,
73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1068 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Intra-Firm Conflicts]. See
also Tybor, Conflicts: When Big Isn't Better, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1979, at 1, col 4;
17, col 2.
3 "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client" ABA
CODE or PRoFEsSIoNAL BEsPoNSmILnTY, Canon 4. [The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, its Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, are herein-
after cited, respectively, as CoD, Canon, EC, and DR.]
4 "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of
a Client" Canon 5.
r "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
Canon 9.
0 Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) of the Code has been relied upon by courts in
disqualification proceedings as a firm-disqualification rule. It reads: "If a lawyer is
required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Discipli-
nary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer a.liated with him or his
firm, may accept or continue such employment." See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin,
606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12,
1979).
Although DR 5-105(D) in its present form dates back only to 1974, see text
accompanying notes 69-72 infra, the rule it embodies has long been observed by
courts in disqualification proceedings. See sources cited in ABA Commi. oil ETMcs
& PRorEssioNAL IEspoNsinrrY, OPIMrONs, No. 342 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
ABA OPINION 342], -reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 517 n.2 (1976).
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representation may disqualify every member of his or her law firm,
by means of a presumption that everyone shares in the "infected"
attorney's knowledge.7
With increasing frequency, law firms faced with the possibility
of disqualification have attempted to rebut this presumption of
imputed knowledge by adopting procedures designed to create an
impermeable barrier to intrafirm exchange of confidential informa-
tion. Called "screens" or "Chinese walls," these procedures aim to
isolate the disqualification to the lawyer or lawyers infected with
the privileged information that is the source of the ethical prob-
lem, and thereby to allow other attorneys in the firm to carry on
the questioned representation free of any taint of misuse of con-
fidences. Typical walling procedures include prohibiting the
tainted attorney(s) from having any connection with the case or
receiving any share of the fees attributable to it, banning relevant
discussions with or the transfer of relevant documents to or from
the tainted attorney(s), restricting access to files, educating all mem-
bers of the firm as to the importance of the wall, and separating,
both organizationally and physically, groups of attorneys working
on conflicting matters.
Although courts have mostly looked askance at the Chinese
wall defense to firm disqualification,8 their examinations of the
issue have been largely superficial. Many commentators writing
about disqualification mention Chinese walls but either pay them
insufficient attention or fail to analyze them adequately." A typically
'See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975).
8 See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane
granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977). But see
Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en bane). See also
Central Milk Prods. Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991-93, 993
(8th Cir. 1978) (discussion of screening procedures not to be construed as approv-
ing practice that probes "outer limits of... professional conduct"); Hull v. Celanese
Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975) (screening argument "somewhat tech-
nical" and overlooked "the spirit of Canon 9"); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co.,
201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1962) (firm disqualified although it "took particular pains" to segregate disqualified
partner).
9 See, e.g., G. HAzARD, supra note 2, at 113; Aroson, Conflict of Interest, 52
WA sH. L. REv. 807, 848, 855 (1977); Lacovara, Restricting the Private Practice of
Former Government Lawyers, 20 Anax. L. REv. 369 (1978); Liebman, The Chang-
ing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L.
Rzv. 996, 1019-20 (1979); Note, The Former Government Attorney and the Code
of Professional Responsibility: Insulation or Disqualification, 26 CATH. U. L. REv.
402 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Insulation or Disqualification]; Note, Ethical Prob-
lems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Dis-
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glib, though wickedly funny, example is Professor Hazard's remark
that "'[w]alling off' is thus like the alleged New England practice
of bundling, having neither the credibility of real prophylaxis nor
the dignity of real self-control." 10
This dearth of analysis is disturbing if only because of the
severe consequences that follow from law-firm disqualification. Dis-
qualification restricts the client's right to counsel of its own choice,
delays the resolution of litigation, and subjects the client to higher
costs." Mechanical application of firm disqualification rules can
also have undesirable effects beyond the confines of any particular
litigation. Imputing knowledge of confidential information to all
those associated with a firm may operate to restrict the mobility of
attorneys because a hiring decision may subject an attorney's new law
firm to disqualification in any representation adverse to the clients
of that attorney's old firm.12 Such a result is especially troubling
when the former employer is a public agency-few young lawyers
will be eager to join government service if their opportunities for
future employment in the private sector are thereby curtailed.'3 In
addition to these restraints on mobility, it is conceivable that strict
firm-disqualification practices will ultimately serve to inhibit the
qualification, 1977 Duxa L.J. 512; Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former
Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025 (1977); Note, Business as Usual: The
Former Government Attorney and ABA Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), 28 HAsTNs
L.J. 1537 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Business as Usual]; Note, Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Attorney Disqualification for Conflict of Inter-
est, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J. 271 (1979); Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Represent-
ing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TExAs L. Rtv. 726 (1979);
Comment, Access to Work Product of Disqualified Counsel, 46 U. Cm. L. tlRv. 443
(1979); 82 DrcK. L. REv. 625 (1978); 28 EMoRY L.J. 215 (1979); 30 Ox.A. L.
REv. 365 (1977); 12 SuroL_ L. R v. 189 (1978).
1o G. HAzAmD, supra note 2, at 113. Contrary to the import of Professor
Hazard's assertion, lawyers are neither scoundrels for whom nothing short of "real
prophylaxis" is needed, nor are they morally superior patricians, to whom anything
less than "real self-control" is an affront to dignity. Indeed, if either of these
extreme characterizations were correct, a code of professional ethics would be
superfluous. As ordinary, fallible human beings, conscientious lawyers may well
draw strength both from the reduced opportunity for ethical error that walling off
aims to achieve and from the wall's function as a constant reminder of the lawyer's
professional responsibility.
11 Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Indus.,
Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 1973); American Can Co. v.
Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971); see Comment, The Avail-
ability of the Work Product of a Disqualified Attorney: What Standard?, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 1607, 1630-35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Work Product.]
12 See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F.
Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Intra-Firmr
Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1069-72.
13 See Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, 70 HAv. L. REv. 657, 657 (1957); sources cited in note 9 supra.
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size of law firms,14 unduly restricting their ability to meet the
changing needs of legal practice.
This Comment begins by analyzing in part I the purpose of
the Chinese wall defense and the kinds of ethical problems with re-
spect to which it can meaningfully be employed. Part II canvasses
the case law on Chinese walls, with particular focus on Armstrong
v. McAlpin,15 a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Having concluded that existing precedent sup-
ports, or at least does not foreclose, acceptance of the Chinese wall
defense in certain kinds of cases, the discussion then turns in part
III to the extensive experience of financial institutions with the
Chinese wall solution to conflicts of interest. A comparison of
law-firm walls with walls in financial institutions leads to the con-
clusion that, in general, Chinese walls will be sufficiently effective
to rebut the presumption that all members of a law firm share in
a client's confidences. But because the risk of disclosure or misuse
of confidences and secrets is a question of fact, the success or failure
of the Chinese wall defense must turn on the facts and circum-
stances of each case. A compendium of the factors influencing that
determination serves as the focus of part IV.
I. BACKGROUND: DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
Although judicial encounters with the Chinese wall defense
to firm disqualification have been few, they suffice to demonstrate
confusion over which types of offenses Chinese walls might con-
ceivably work to remedy. It thus becomes necessary to begin with a
preliminary overview of the law on disqualification motions.'6
For this purpose, it is helpful to distinguish between disqualification
14 See Intra-Firmr Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1069-72. Of course, other internal
factors may limit the growth of law firms. See Bodine, supra note 1.
15 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bano granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec.
12, 1979).
16 The subject has been explored in detail in recent literature. In addition to
the sources cited in note 9 supra, see R. WisE, LEG.L ETMcs (Supp. 1977);
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HAnv. L. REv.
702 (1977); O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 313 (1979); Symposium, The Legal
Profession, 20 A=ux. L. REv. 361 (1979); Symposium, Reflections on a Decade
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: The Need for Reform, 57 N.C. L.
ryEv. 497 (1979); Symposium, American Bar Association Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 48 TExAs L. REv. 255 (1970); Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests:
Representation of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REv. 61
(1975); Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Im-
propriety, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 343 (1976); Note, Ethical Considerations When
an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Need for a Realistic Application of
Canon Nine, 52 Cm.-KENT L. 1Ev. 525 (1975); Note, The Second Circuit and
Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FornHAm
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motions arising out of an attorney's acceptance of employment
against a former client (successive representation) and those arising
out of employment against an existing client (concurrent represen-
tation). In the successive representation context, the chief ethical
concern, addressed in Canon 4, is that confidential information
relating to the former client will be disclosed or used to his dis-
advantage. Although the same danger is implicated in concurrent
representation cases, there an additional ethical concern is present
-the attorney's Canon 5 duty to serve his or her client with undi-
vided loyalty.17 In both types of situations, Canon 9's command to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety applies.' 8
The standard for disqualification of an individual attorney in a
successive representation case was announced by Judge Weinfeld
more than twenty-five years ago. 19 If the matters embraced by the
adverse representations are "substantially related," the attorney
must be disqualified, even though it has not been shown that the
attorney was in fact privy to the former client's confidences.
20
L. REv. 130 (1975); Note, Appearance of Impropriety as the Sole Ground for
Disqualification, 31 U. Mxrinr L. 1Ev. 1516 (1977).
The research on which this Comment is based is limited to civil cases in the
federal courts.
1" Although an attorney's Canon 5 duty to serve a client with undivided loyalty
survives the termination of the attorney-client relationship and may disqualify him
or her from accepting a subsequent adverse representation, that ethical problem for
the most part will have no effect on the question of the firm's disqualification and
need not be discussed further in this Comment. See ABA Coml~msN ON EVALUATION
OF PR FESSIONAL STANDARnDs, MODEL Rurros OF PROFEssiONAL CoDucr § 7.1(b)
(2), Comment, at 110-11 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RuLEs]. In successive representation cases, the chief ethical concern relevant
to law-firm disqualification is Canon 4s proscription on the disclosure or misuse of
client confidences and secrets. See Work Product, supra note 11, at 1615 n.52.
.
8 Disqualification cases involving government attorneys are often dealt with
exclusively under Canon 9 because Canons 4 and 5 are premised upon the existence
of an attorney-client relationship, see, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566
F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978), overruled in
part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability Litig., No. 79-1781
(8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980) (en bane), an element lacking in the government context.
The policies underlying those Canons nevertheless extend beyond the confines of
the attorney-client relationship and may play a prominent role in Canon 9 analysis.
See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc
granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979).
19T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953).
20 E.g., Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); In re
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976); American
Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 984 (3d Cir. 1975); Eme Indus., Inc. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973).
Note that the substantial relationship test is a rule of evidence, not an inexor-
able rule of law. Consolidated Theatres, Inc.'v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d
920, 924 (2d Cir. 1953); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., [1974-2] Trade Cas. ir 75,392, at
98,277 (D. Utah 1974), re'd in part on other grounds, 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.
1975).
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Courts refuse to make a more direct inquiry into the lawyer's knowl-
edge because to do so would require the party moving for disquali-
fication to reveal the very confidences it wishes to keep secret.21
Traditionally, disqualification of an individual lawyer was
understood to disqualify all lawyers affiliated with him or her, a
rule now embodied in Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D).22 With respect
to misuse of confidences, this rule proceeds upon the assumption
that a lawyer's knowledge of a client's confidences and secrets is
shared by all the other lawyers in his or her firm. Although per-
haps realistic enough in the days when law firms were smaller and
practice less specialized, the validity of an irrebuttable presumption
of shared confidences is today open to question.23 Concern over the
side effects of disqualification on the mobility of attorneys, coupled
with other considerations, has led some courts to discard or limit
this irrebuttable presumption in favor of a pragmatic approach.
24
2 1 E.g., NCK Org'n v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
22 See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Intra-Firm Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1069; 82 DicK. L. RBv. 625,
628 (1978).
2 4 
It is important to distinguish here between a number of different presump-
tions that the courts regularly confuse. The initial presumption is that an attorney
who represents a client acquires actual knowledge of the client's confidences.
Although such knowledge is presumed, courts often refer to it as "actual knowl-
edge," perhaps because of the nearly universal view that the presumption is ir-
rebuttable. See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc.,
607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). But see City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec.
Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mer., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); cf. Canadian Gulf Lines v. Triton
Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1976) (although client swore he
disclosed confidences to attorney, court was convinced that any such confidences
were not "received" in the sense of being "cognitively processed or retained").
Some courts have found a way around this presumption by finding that the attorney
in question did not really "represent" the client in the ordinary sense, but merely
worked on peripheral matters. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975).
A second presumption holds that an attorney having "actual knowledge" of a
client's confidences shares that knowledge with all the other lawyers in his or her
firm. Although some courts seem to have held this presumption irrebuttable, see,
e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability Litig., No.
79-1781 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980) (en banc); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978);
Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976); Laskey Bros. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955), a definite trend now
exists towards a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v.
Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Akerly
v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1977); Gas-A-Tron v. Union
Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.
1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209
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In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,25
a young lawyer who had worked for a law firm of moderately large
size established his own firm and brought suit on behalf of a client
against a client of his former employer. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, upholding the district court's refusal to dis-
qualify the young lawyer, took note of the former law firm's size
and the rapid turnover of its young associates, and observed:
[I]t would be absurd to conclude that immediately upon
their entry on duty... [associates of large law firms] be-
come the recipients of knowledge as to the names of all
the firm's clients, the contents of all files relating to such
clients, and all the confidential disclosures by client
officers or employees to any lawyer in the firm.26
The court went on to hold that the presumption of imputed knowl-
edge was rebuttable, and found "reason to differentiate for dis-
qualification purposes between lawyers who become heavily in-
volved in the facts of a particular matter and those who enter briefly
on the periphery for a limited and specific purpose relating solely
to legal questions." 27 A discriminating approach has also been
followed in cases involving attorneys formerly employed by public
agencies, in which concern for the employment prospects of former
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 432 F. Supp. 694, 697 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd on other grounds, 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability
Litig., No. 79-1781 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980) (en bane); Redd v. Shell Oil Co.,
t1974-2] Trade Cas. 7f75,392, at 98,278 (D. Utah 1974), re'd in part on other
grounds, 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975). This Comment will refer to this pre-
sumption as the presumption of imputed knowledge, even though the same term
could be applied to the first presumption described above.
A third presumption concerns what some courts have called a double imputa-
tion: the presumption that the knowledge of confidences ascribed to an individual
lawyer by means of the presumption of imputed knowledge is shared with all the
other lawyers in his or her firm. In reality, of course, this imputation is triple--
knowledge of confidences is first imputed to the attorney representing the client,
then to associated lawyers in his or her firm, and then again to lawyers who become
associated with those associated lawyers. Not surprisingly, the courts have refused
to countenance such double (or triple) imputation and have denied the existence
of this presumption. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380,
386-87 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim
Prods. Liability Litig., No. 79-1781 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980) (en bane); American
Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
25 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The Second Circuit and
Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FoRDHrus
L. REv. 130 (1975).
26 518 F.2d at 753-54.
27 Id. 756.
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government attorneys and the government's ability to attract legal
talent have played an important role.
28
Once it is accepted that the presumption of imputed knowledge
is rebuttable, the Chinese wall defense to firm disqualification
begins to have meaning. An effective Chinese wall would serve to
prevent the flow of information from the attorney or attorneys
with knowledge of the former client's confidences and secrets to the
rest of the attorneys in the firm. If walls were accepted as defenses,
they could be employed to rebut the presumption of imputed
knowledge and thereby to restrict the scope of the disqualification
to the walled-off attorneys.
When adverse representations are undertaken concurrently,
the "substantial relationship" test is not controlling, and the ap-
propriateness of disqualification must be measured against "the
duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his
clients." 29 The danger of misuse of client confidences may also
be present, but the court's attention in these cases will likely be
riveted on the more compelling grounds provided by Canon 5 and
the ancient maxim that "no man can serve two masters." 30 In-
deed, it has been held that concurrent adverse representations are
"prima facie improper." 31 Thus, although Chinese wall defenses
have been raised in concurrent representation cases,32 the effort is
not likely to be successful-even if the courts were to accept the de-
fense as rebutting the presumption of imputed knowledge, the prob-
28 E.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793-94 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en
banc); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 624-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd,
606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12,
1979); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
Government attorneys and their associates in the private sector may be liable
to criminal sanctions for unethical conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp.
1979), as amended by Act of June 22, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-28, 93 Stat. 76.
29 Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976);
accord, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268,
271 (2d Cir. 1975)); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see Work Product, supra note 11, at 1614-17.
30 Matthew 6:24. E.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567
F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 43-65 infra.
The court will probably focus on Canon 5 because it will more likely be dis-
positive; the bar against serving two masters prevents concurrent, adverse repre-
sentation even when the two matters are so unrelated as to present no danger of
misuse of confidences. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Work Product, supra note 11, at 1615-16.
31 Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976).
3 2 E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
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lem of dual loyalties would remain. Although conflicting repre-
sentations could be conducted by different attorneys in the same
firm, every attorney in the firm would nevertheless have an eco-
nomic interest in the success of both representations. 33 Whatever
the effectiveness of Chinese walls in impeding the flow of confiden-
tial information, it cannot seriously be maintained that such in-
formation barriers are capable of curing conflicts of interest arising
from a firm's divided loyalties.3
Whether successive or concurrent, adverse representations are
likely also to run up against Canon 9's mandate to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety. Although broad in scope, that require-
ment's main thrust is to obligate a lawyer to "promote public con-
fidence" in the American legal system "and in the legal profes-
sion." 31 No matter how effective, Chinese walls are not likely to
foster public confidence because the details of a law firm's efforts
to avoid disqualification will doubtless make but a small impression
upon public awareness. 3  Thus, even if a firm succeeds in comply-
33 'This holds true even for salaried associates and for firms not organized on a
partnership basis because it may fairly be assumed that salaried employees, like
partners, have an economic stake in the financial success of the employing organiza-
tion.
3 4
0ne might argue that a wall barring attorneys working on case A from
receiving any remuneration from adverse case B, and vice-versa, effectively resolves
the problem of divided loyalties. The effectiveness of such an arrangement has
been denied by at least one court, albeit in a slightly different context. Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No.
79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979) (former government attorney case). Even if the fees
attributable to the adverse case could effectively be diverted, the long-range eco-
nomic interests of the attorneys are too closely allied with those of the firm to
resolve doubts about dual loyalties.
Some commentators have argued for narrow exceptions to the ban on concur-
rent, adverse representations, e.g., in uncontested divorce actions and in representa-
tion of the indigent by legal aid societies. See Aronson, supra note 9; Note, Simul-
taneous Representation: Transaction Resolution in the Adversary System, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 86 (1977); note 165 infra. Although it is conceivable that Chinese
walls could play a role in these special situations, further exploration of them is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For the sake of simplicity, the futility of the
Chinese wall defense in cases of concurrent representation will be assumed.
35EC 9-1. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d
639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974); Work Product, supra note 11, at 1617-19.
3 6 See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 9, at 848; Insulation or Disqualification, supra
note 9, at 417-18; Business as Usual, supra note 9, at 1553, 1566-68; 30 OKLA. L.
Ruv. 365, 373-74 (1977); cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir.
1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979) (casual observers
would most likely be unaware of arrangements aimed at financially insulating
disqualified attorney).
Many authorities that approve screening in Canon 9 cases do not focus on
public awareness. See, e.g., id. 33; Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793
(Ct Cl. 1977) (en bane); ABA OPINIoN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J.
517, 520-21 (1976); CoNM =mz ON PROFESSIONAL AND JurcAL Evmcs, Assx
OF Tim BAR OF =m Crry oF NEw YorK, OPINIONS, No. 889 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NYC BA_ OPINION 889] reprinted in 31 REcoRD 552, 566-71 (1976);
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ing with the letter of Canon 4 by erecting a wall, Canon 9's con-
cern with the spirit of legal ethics must still be reckoned with. To
the extent, then, that a violation of Canon 9, without more, warrants
disqualification, the Chinese wall defense will fail.
Recently, however, Judge Feinberg, writing for a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Board of Education v.
Nyquist,37 held that "unless an attorney's conduct tends to 'taint
the underlying trial,'" a mere "appearance of impropriety is simply
too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except
in the rarest cases." 38 If Judge Feinberg's sensible view prevails,39
then Chinese wall defenses to charges of combined Canon 4 and
Canon 9 violations may yet succeed, even though the wall is relevant
primarily to the Canon 4 problem of misuse of confidences.
It should be noted that courts often analyze motions for dis-
qualification of former government attorneys solely under Canon
9 because, technically speaking, no Canon 4 violation exists. 40 To
the extent that these cases are concerned with the possible misuse
of confidential information acquired while in the government's
employ, they involve an impropriety that may "taint the underlying
trial" and that is therefore more than just "apparent." Except for
the lack of a former attorney-client relationship between the ex-
government attorney and the party moving for disqualification,
such cases are essentially similar to cases involving Canon 4 viola-
Petition and Memorandum in Support of Petition of the Board of Governors of the
District of Columbia Bar for Amendment of the Provisions Implementing Canon 9,
Submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Feb. 9, 1979), reprinted
in Final Revolving Door Proposal, DISTRIcT LAw., April/May, 1979, at 47 [here-
inafter cited as Revolving Door Proposal].
37 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
38 Id. 1246, 1247 (quoting in part W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671,
678 (2d Cir. 1976)).
39 The Nyquist position has been adopted or approvingly cited in the following:
United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3451 (1980) (indictment not dismissed although government attorney
violated DR 5-102 by acting as both witness and advocate before grand jury);
Emm Ess Metals Co. v. Triumph Alloys Intl, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. f[ 62,680
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (corporation's former general counsel may represent party suing
corporation absent Canon 4 violation); Kerry Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
470 F. Supp. 1032, 1035-37 (W.D. Pa. 1979); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust
Litig., 470 F. Supp. 495, 502 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Danziger v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, No. 77 Civ. 1335 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1979); Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724-25 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
Although no reported cases have explicitly disapproved Nyquist, the decision
in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted,
No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979), decided by a different panel of the same court of
appeals, appears to contradict it, in substance, if not in form. See text accompany-
ing notes 78-102 infra.
40 See note 18 supra.
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tions, and the Nyquist reservations about disqualification based
solely on apparent impropriety do not apply.41
This briefest of outlines of disqualification law has attempted
to identify those ethical violations against which the Chinese wall
defense to firm disqualification might conceivably be successful.
To summarize: Chinese walls are intended to prevent the flow of
confidential information. If effective, a question to be taken up in
part III, Chinese walls could serve as defenses to violations of Canon
4's strictures against the disclosure or misuse of confidences in suc-
cessive representation cases, and to similar offenses under Canon 9
involving ex-government attorneys. But Chinese walls offer no cure
to a firm's Canon 5 problems in concurrent representation cases or
to the broad range of apparent improprieties dealt with under
Canon 9.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF THE
CHINESE WALL DEFENSE
Federal appellate courts have ruled on the Chinese wall de-
fense to firm disqualification in only four cases, two involving con-
current representation of adverse clients and two involving succes-
sive representations by attorneys formerly employed by the federal
government. A review of the facts and conclusions in these cases
will clarify the present legal status of the Chinese wall defense.42
A. Concurrent Representation Cases
The two courts of appeals that have commented on Chinese
walls in concurrent representation cases have adopted a similar
stance. In Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.4" and
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,4 the wall de-
fense met with sweeping and peremptory rejection. Although the
facts in Fund of Funds were complex, it suffices to say that a law
41 See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247-48 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Mansfield, J., concurring).
42 But these cases may have no effect on the acceptance of walls in other
contexts. For example, several agencies endorse screening procedures. E.g., 17
C.F.R. §200.735-8(e) (1979) (SEC); 31 C.F.R. §10.26(c) (1978) (IRS); 46
C.F.R. § 502.32(c) (1978) (Fed. Maritime Comm'n). For a general discussion of
one of these regulations, see Chief Counsel's Advisory Committee on Rules of
Professional Conduct, Final Report to the Hon. Meade Whitaker, Chief Counsel,
41 Fed. Reg. 41,106, 41,108-18 (1976).
43 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
44 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). See Note,
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Attorney Disqualification for
Conflict of Interest, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J. 271 (1979); 28 EmonRy L.J. 215 (1979).
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firm sought to defend itself against accusations of simultaneous,
adverse representations by arguing that a Chinese wall built be-
tween its attorneys working for the adverse clients prevented any
confidential information from passing hands.45  The trial judge,
finding a breach in the wall, curtly replied, "the Court finds that
such a 'Chinese Wall' cannot be built within a single law firm." 46
The Second Circuit added in a footnote: "We incline to agree." 47
Significantly, however, the appellate court also noted that con-
temporaneous, adverse representations constitute a breach of a
client's "absolute right to the firm's undivided loyalty."4s
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,49 West-
inghouse brought an antitrust action against a group of uranium
producers, including three oil companies.50 Westinghouse's lead
attorney for the uranium matter was the Chicago firm Kirkland &
4s 567 F.2d at 229 n.10.
46 Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 96 (S.D.
N.Y.), reo'd in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
47 567 F.2d at 229 n.10.
481d. 233 (citing Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
In greater detail, the facts in Fund of Funds were as follows. A mutual fund
retained Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (Morgan) as counsel in a suit against all but
one of the principals in an allegedly fraudulent securities transaction. The one
principal not sued was the fund's auditor, Arthur Andersen & Co. (Andersen),
whom Morgan had served as regional counsel for many years. In a separate action
in which Morgan took no official part, the fund, represented only by the law firm of
Milgrim, Thomajan & Jacobs (Milgrim), sued Andersen for its role in the alleged
fraud.
Andersen moved to disqualify Milgrim on the grounds that it was acting as
Morgan's alter ego, and that Morgan, had it been the counsel of record, would
clearly have been disqualified because of its long-standing representation of Ander-
sen as regional counsel. The trial judge, in order to rule on the disqualification of
Milgrim, found it necessary to rule first on the question whether Morgan would
have been disqualified if it had represented the fund in the action against Andersen.
435 F. Supp. at 94. Although Morgan was not represented in the disqualification
proceeding and submitted no briefs, the trial judge read the deposition testimony
of the Morgan attorneys as taking the position that the construction of a Chinese
wall had prevented the disclosure of any confidential information. Id. 96 & n.45.
The district court, denying the possibility of a Chinese wall and finding that the
two groups of Morgan attorneys were not in fact separated, ruled that Morgan
would have been disqualified from bringing the suit against Andersen. It went
on, however, to hold that Milgrim's contacts with Morgan were not sufficient to
disqualify Milgrim as well. Id. 98. The court of appeals agreed with the lower
court's view as to Morgan but also found sufficient cause to disqualify Milgrim.
567 F.2d at 227.
49580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
50 The three oil companies were Gulf Oil, Kerr-McGee, and Getty Oil. The
case in the district court was Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448
F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Another appeal from that decision was decided
by the Seventh Circuit under the name Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Ellis.51 The oil companies were members of a petroleum trade
association, which had retained Kirkland's Washington, D.C. office
to compile a legislative report as part of a lobbying effort. Pur-
suant to this representation, Kirkland's Washington branch received
from the oil companies confidential data pertinent to the antitrust
suit.
52
The oil companies moved to have Kirkland disqualified. Kirk-
land responded, in part, that it had built a Chinese wall between
its Chicago attorneys working for Westinghouse and its Washington
attorneys working for the trade association. 53  The district court
found that Kirkland's work for the trade association did not create
an attorney-client relationship with the individual member com-
panies and thus perceived no violations of Canons 4 and 5.54 Tak-
ing note of Kirkland's large size, the use of separate teams of
attorneys separated geographically as well as organizationally, the
absence of actual disclosure, and recent decisions undermining the
traditional presumption of imputed knowledge,m5 the district court
refused to disqualify the firm, and found the possibility of improper
professional conduct "fairly remote." 56
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. It found an attorney-client
relationship and thus ruled that Canons 4 and 5, as well as Canon 9,
were applicable.5 7 Pointing to a "breach" in the wall, the court
added that it did "not recognize the wall theory as modifying the
presumption that actual knowledge of one or more lawyers in a
firm is imputed to each member of that firm." 58 Addressing the
relevance of law-firm size, the court of appeals saw "no basis for
creating separate disqualification rules for large firms even though
5S Kirkland & Ellis is a Chicago firm with a branch in Washington, D.C. In
1977, Kirkland had 208 attorneys and was the tenth largest law firm in the country.
Cantor, supra note 1, at 216.
52 580 F.2d at 1313-16, 1321.
53 Id. 1321.
54 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1303
(N.D. Ill.), rev. sub noa., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
55 448 F. Supp. at 1304-05. The district court quoted from Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
arf'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), and City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec.
Mllum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
56 448 F. Supp. at 1305.
57 580 F.2d at 1321.
58 Id. Judge Fairchild did not believe Kirkland was raising the Chinese wall
defense on appeal. He noted that had Kirkland shown that the Washington and
Chicago groups were effectively insulated from each other, "imputation of knowl-
edge to all partners would be eliminated from consideration and a different result
may have been appropriate." Id. n.28.
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the burden of complying with ethical considerations will naturally
fall more heavily upon their shoulders." 59 Although the appellate
court's discussion focused primarily on the Canon 4 problem, it
briefly mentioned as a factor in its decision the Canon 5 implica-
tions of Kirkland's simultaneous, adverse representations. 0
What significance do the decisions in Fund of Funds and West-
inghouse have for the future of the Chinese wall defense? The
courts' laconic remarks surely demonstrate a judicial hostility to
screening devices in concurrent representation cases, but they do
not spell the doom of Chinese walls. Even granting that the courts
reached correct results and were partly justified in their skepticism
regarding the potential effectiveness of Chinese walls, a more dis-
criminating analysis is nevertheless required.
Perhaps the chief distinguishing feature of these cases is that
they both involve contemporaneous, conflicting representations.
According to the analysis presented in part I of this Comment,61
Chinese walls cannot combat dual-loyalty problems, and it is thus
not surprising that courts should find the wall defense inadequate
in cases presenting possible Canon 5 violations. But that inade-
quacy does not undercut the validity of Chinese walls in successive
representation cases in which Canon 5 complications are absent.
As one court, distinguishing Fund of Funds, observed: "Rejection
of screening as a device to prevent exchange of information within
a law firm between attorneys with conflicting interests is not neces-
sarily a rejection of screening in all circumstances." 62
The opinion of the court of appeals in Fund of Funds, which
rested its judgment as to disqualification solely on the Canon 5
issue, readily lends itself to this distinction. Westinghouse, how-
ever, is not so easily distinguished. Had the Westinghouse court
followed the lead of other courts faced with concurrent, adverse
representations,63 it would have focused on the dual-loyalty prob-
lem and found a clear basis for disqualification in Canon 5. But
the court in Westinghouse chose instead to concentrate, albeit in a
somewhat muddled fashion, on the Canon 4 aspect. Nevertheless,
one may still distinguish concurrent from successive representations
in terms of Canon 4's purposes, even absent Canon 5 overtones.
59 Id. 1321.
60 Id. 1322.
61 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
6 2 Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane
granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979).
6 3 In addition to Fund of Funds, see, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,
528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
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When two groups of attorneys within a single law firm are
engaged in conflicting representations at one and the same time,
there is a greater danger of disclosure of confidences than would
exist if one of the representations took place in the past. In the
first situation, the work is ongoing, papers are circulating, and the
attorneys are actively going about their tasks, discussing, as people
do, their everyday cares with their associates. By contrast, in the
second situation, only one group of attorneys is actively engaged.
The other representation is over and done with-documents relating
to it are filed away, and the attorneys who worked on it are newly
occupied with fresh business. Given the natural human concern
with the present, it is less likely that attorneys who worked on the
concluded litigation will inadvertently disclose confidential infor-
mation acquired in the past.6 Thus, the Westinghouse court's
announcement that it did not recognize Chinese walls as rebutting
the presumption of imputed knowledge may be limited to the
circumstances of that case: Chinese walls constructed between at-
torneys currently pursuing adverse representations. It need not
be construed as rejecting the Chinese wall defense in successive
representation cases. So limited, the Westinghouse view can be
expected to play a minor role in the development of the Chinese
wall defense because, as previously indicated, Canon 5 provides an
ample alternative basis for disqualification in concurrent representa-
tion cases.
An additional reason justifies limiting the reach of Fund of
Funds and Westinghouse, a reason that finds support in the axiom
that courts should not paint with broad strokes when dealing with
ethical principles.6" Because in both cases the courts found that the
alleged walls had actually been breached, their comments on the
validity of the Chinese wall defense were dicta. That defense, as
advanced here, does not conclusively establish that confidential in-
formation has not been shared with other attorneys in the firm; it
merely rebuts the presumption that such sharing has occurred.
Evidence that disclosure has in fact taken place serves, in effect, to
nullify the Chinese wall defense.
B. Successive Representation Cases
In the two Chinese wall cases involving law firms employing
former government attorneys, the federal appellate courts reached
64Cf. Liebman, supra note 9, at 1016 (time lag between representations
diminishes value of confidential information).
65 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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opposite results. The Court of Claims, sitting en banc, vacated
a disqualification order issued by a trial judge in Kesselhaut v.
United States.66  In Armstrong v. McAlpin,67 a panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court and
found disqualification appropriate. Central to an understanding of
both decisions is Formal Opinion 342 of the Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association.
8
1. Formal Opinion 342
Prior to 1974, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D) prohibited affiliated
lawyers from accepting or continuing an employment if any one
of them was required to decline or withdraw from employment
under Disciplinary Rule 5-105, which concerns conflicts of interest.
In that year, the rule was expanded to prohibit representation by a
firm whenever one of its lawyers is forbidden by any disciplinary
rule from engaging in a representation. 9 On its face, the amended
rule, combined with Disciplinary Rule 9-101 (B), which commands
a lawyer not to "accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee," 'o
would necessitate widespread disqualification of firms employing
ex-government attorneys3' In response to this problem, the ABA's
Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 342. Concerned that an
inflexible application of Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D) would unduly
limit the employment opportunities of government attorneys upon
leaving government service and impair the ability of government to
recruit talented young professionals, the Committee endorsed a
screening procedure. In the Ethics Committee's view, Disciplinary
66 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc), noted in 82 Dic. L. REv. 625
(1978).
67 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec.
12, 1979).
68 ABA OpnioN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 (1976). See
generally Commentary, The Disqualification Dilemma: DR 5-105(D) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 56 NEB. L. Rlv. 692 (1977).
69 ABA OMnioN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 517 & n.1
(1976).
7o DR 9-101(B).
71 Subsequent statements by the principals involved in the 1974 amendment to
DR 5-105(D) indicate that the ABA did not anticipate the amendment's impact on
the firms of former government attorneys. See Moskowitz, Can D.C. Lawyers Cut
the Ties That Bind?, Jums DOCTOR, Sept., 1976, at 34.
Recently, Professor Sutton, who served as Reporter for the ABA committee that
wrote the Code of Professional Responsibility, revealed that the Code's disciplinary
rules, including DR 5-105, were drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and
were never intended to be used as rules governing disqualification motions. Sutton,
How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 497,
514-16 (1979).
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Rule 5-105 (D) should not apply to the firm, partners, or associates
of a disqualified lawyer who has been screened "to the satisfaction
.of the government agency concerned from participation in the work
and compensation of the firm on any matter over which as a public
'employee he had substantial responsibility." 72
2. Kesselhaut v. United States
The spirit, if not the letter, of Formal Opinion 342 was adopted
-by the Court of Claims in Kesselhaut v. United States. 3 The Kes-
selhaut law firm sued to recover fees earned in a prior representa-
tion of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). To represent
it in this fee-recovery suit, Kesselhaut retained the firm of Krooth 8C
Altman. One of Krooth's attorneys, Adolphus Prothro, had been
.general counsel of the FHA while that agency had been Kesselhaut's
client. Accordingly, Protho was personally disqualified from rep-
resenting Kesselhaut in its action against the government. Under
.amended Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D), it seemed as if the entire
Krooth firm should also be disqualified, and the trial judge so
held.74
The Court of Claims, sitting en banc, found that Prothro had
been effectively isolated from his firm's handling of the case, and
that, in addition, the firm had later erected a Chinese wall.75 Con-
cerned that every former government attorney would infect all the
members of any firm he or she joined and "take on the status of a
Typhoid Mary," 76 the court relied on the reasoning behind Formal
Opinion 342 to hold that disqualification of the entire Krooth firm
-was not justified. In one material respect, however, the court went
beyond the ABA Ethics Committee's stance: although Formal Opin-
ion 342 contemplated that the government agency in question
"would exercise a veto over the validity of any screening procedure,
the Kesselhaut court upheld Krooth's Chinese wall despite the gov-
72ABA OpiNION 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 521 (1976).
See also NYC BAR OPIoN 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 REcoiu 552 (1976);
Revolving Door Proposal, supra note 36, at 58.
73 555 F.2d 791 (Ct CL 1977) (en bane).
74 Id. 792.
75 Id. 793. The basis for the wall consisted of a memo to the firm's attorneys,
providing that Prothro is
to continue to have no connection with the case, all other attorneys are not
to discuss it with him and are to prevent any case documents from reach-
ing him, the files are to be kept in a locked file cabinet, the keys . . .
issued to other attorneys, clerks, and secretaries, only on a "need to know"
basis.
76 Id.
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ernment's opposition. The court reasoned that it had a "non-
delegable responsibility" to maintain ethical standards in the cases
before it and could not allow the parties "to debase the matter into
another phase of adversary tactics.
'77
3. Armstrong v. McAlpin
The Chinese wall defense has been litigated more fully in
Armstrong v. McAlpin 78 than in any other reported federal case,
and the recent grant of a rehearing en banc by the Second Circuit
holds the promise of a major ruling on the status of Chinese walls
in former government attorney cases.79 As Assistant Director of the
Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), Theodore Altman had helped supervise an investiga-
tion of McAlpin and others. Upon leaving the SEC in 1975, Altman
joined the law firm of Gordon, Hurwitz, Butowsky, Baker, Weitzen
& Shalov (Gordon). Armstrong, a court-appointed receiver, later
retained the Gordon firm to serve as litigation counsel in a securities
fraud derivative suit against McAlpin and other defendants, an
771d. 794. Accord, NYC BARt OpnON 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31
BEcorU 552, 566 (1976); see also Revolving Door Proposal, supra note 36, at 56-58.
78461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979),
rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979).
79 In granting rehearing en bane, the Second Circuit requested the parties to
brief the question whether an order granting or denying disqualification is appeal-
able. Armstrong v. McAlpin, No. 79-7042 (2d Cir., Dec. 12, 1979) (order granting
rehearing en bane). The Second Circuit now follows the majority rule that orders
denying, as well as orders granting, disqualification are appealable. Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en bane);
accord, e.g., MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F.2d 395, 396 (4th
Cir. 1977) (on rehearing); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir.
1976); Fullmer v. Harper, 517 F.2d 20, 21 (10th Cir. 1975); American Roller Co.
v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 983 (3d Cir. 1975); Tomlinson v. Florida Iron & Metal,
Inc., 291 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally Comment, The Appeal-
ability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal
Courts, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Appealability]; see
also Work Product, supra note 11, at 1631-32.
But as disqualification motions have proliferated and become an important,
harassing litigation tactic, a growing minority of circuits has distinguished rulings
denying disqualification from those granting it, and held the former non-appealable.
In Re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability Litig., No. 79-1781 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980)
(en bane) (prospective ruling); Melamed v. ]TT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d
290, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1979) (prospective holding); Community Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1026-28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A rule against appealability
has long prevailed in the Ninth Circuit. Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521-22
(9th Cir. 1964).
The Second Circuit has previously hinted at discontent with the Silver Chrysler
rule. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 n.8 (2d Cir.
1979); Appealability, supra, at 451 n.5. Should the Second Circuit join this trend
and follow the lead of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in limiting the new rule to
prospective application, it would still have to reach the merits of the disqualification
issue posed by Armstrong.
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action which grew directly out of the SEC investigation. The Gor-
don firm, concluding that Altman was disqualified by virtue of his
participation in the SEC investigation, sought to ward off disquali-
fication of the entire firm by screening Altman from the firm's
conduct of the suit in accordance with Formal Opinion 342. The
SEC gave its approval to this arrangement, as did the trial judge who
had appointed Armstrong. 0
The defendants in the derivative suit moved to disqualify
Gordon and argued that Altman's knowledge acquired in the SEC
investigation must be imputed to all members of the firm. The
district court reviewed Formal Opinion 342 and a similar opinion
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,8' and on the
basis of the walling procedures and other evidence found disquali-
fication unnecessary. The court distinguished the Second Circuit's
opinion in Fund of Funds as involving an issue of conflicting repre-
sentations and expressed agreement with the Court of Claims's
opinion in Kesselhaut. Attempts by the defendants to impeach the
effectiveness of the procedures employed to screen Altman were
rejected by the district court as factually incorrect.82
On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Newman, reversed.8 3 Declining to
formulate a general rule concerning the law firms of former govern-
ment attorneys who are disqualified under Disciplinary Rule 9-
101 (B), the court focused on the danger that government attorneys
will misuse their authority in order to enhance their prospects for
private employment. Two relevant factors affecting the scope of a
disqualification were identified. First, whether the firm should
be disqualified depends upon whether the "matter" for which the
former government attorney once had "substantial responsibility"
presents risks against which Disciplinary Rule 9-101 (B) was meant
to guard.84 On this account, the court of appeals attempted to dis-
80 461 F. Supp. at 623-24. The trial court described the screening procedures
as follows:
Altman is excluded from participation in the action, has no access to
relevant files and derives no remuneration from funds obtained by the firm
from prosecuting this action. No one at the firm is permitted to discuss
the matter in his presence or allow him to view any document related to
this litigation, and Altman has not imparted any information concerning
Growth Fund to the firm.
Id. 624.
81 NYC BAR OPnmoN 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 BEcoRD 552 (1976).
82 461 F. Supp. at 626 n.5.
83 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec.
12, 1979).
84 Id. 33.
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tinguish Kesselhaut as a case in which the disqualified attorney's,
governmental duties were only tangentially related to the subject
matter of the litigation and thus had offered him no opportunity
for enhancing his employment prospects. Second, extension of
disqualification to the law firm turns on the nature of the ex-
government attorney's former responsibilities-if the disqualified
attorney's role was active and personal, then a substantial appear-
ance of impropriety exists if the firm is permitted to continue the
representation, and screening procedures would not suffice to over-
come it; but if the attorney's role was merely formal or supervisory,
then the appearance of impropriety is not so great and possibly
susceptible to cure by appropriate screening measures."-
In the case before it, the court found as a matter of law that
a Chinese wall, no matter how carefully observed, could not prevent
disqualification:
A government attorney with direct, personal involvement
in a matter involving enforcement of laws that are the
basis for private causes of action must understand, and it
must appear to the public, that there will be no possibility
of financial reward if he succumbs to the temptation to
shape the government action in the hope of enhancing
private employment.8 6
Despite this strong language, Judge Newman was careful to
narrow the scope of his opinion. Rejecting the defendants' con-
tentions that Fund of Funds had settled the legal status of the
Chinese wall defense once and for all, he instead limited that case
to its context of contemporaneous, conflicting representations.8 7
Furthermore, although the parties and the court below focused on
the issue whether Altman's knowledge of the McAlpin matter
should be imputed to the rest of his firm,8 8 the court of appeals
chose not to dispute the trial court's finding that Altman's knowl-
edge in fact was not shared. That finding was significant because
it necessarily presupposed that the presumption of imputed knowl-
edge was rebuttable in former government attorney cases. 89 By
concentrating instead on the danger that government service might
be used as a tool for enhancing private employment prospects,
Judge Newman at least left open the possibility of a future ruling
85 Id.
86 Id. 34.
87 Id. 32.
88 461 F. Supp. at 624-27.
89 See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
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that the Chinese wall defense suffices to rebut the presumption of
imputed knowledge.
However, narrowly drawn, the panel's opinion in Armstrong
has shortcomings which may not be ignored. Chief among them
is the failure to acknowledge the lessons of the Second Circuit's
recent opinion in Board of Education v. Nyquist.9° In that case
the court announced a rule that disqualification is only appropriate
when the conduct in question "tends to 'taint the underlying
trial'" 91 and suggested that other ethical violations could ade-
quately be dealt with in separate disciplinary proceedings. Apply-
ing Nyquist to the circumstances of Armstrong, it is clear that the
disqualification was not required to protect the underlying trial.
The trial court found that the firm's continued representation
would not prejudice the defendants, 9 2 and the court of appeals,
far from disputing that holding, candidly recognized that its dis-
qualification of the Gordon firm was intended "as a prophylactic
measure to guard against misuse of authority by government
lawyers." 93
The Armstrong court's attempt to distinguish Nyquist does
not hold up under scrutiny. The court first argued that Nyquist
did "not inevitably preclude disqualification" 94 for violation of
standards other than Canon 4 or 5, and pointed to a footnote in
Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion in Nyquist, in which he rec-
ognized that a former government attorney could be disqualified
for violating Disciplinary Rule 9-101 (B). 95 Judge Mansfield, how-
ever, clearly agreed with the standard proposed in Judge Feinberg's
opinion for the court in Nyquist; his footnote was appended to a
sentence observing that an "appearance of impropriety" that
affected the outcome of the trial would be rare indeed.96 The
Armstrong court's reliance on the concurring opinion in Nyquist
is therefore incorrect because nothing Judge Mansfield wrote may
be taken as supporting the use of disqualification in private suits
90590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
9ld. 1246 (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678 (2d Cir.
1976)).
92461 F. Supp. at 626.
93 606 F.2d at 34 (footnote omitted).
94 Id. 32.
95 Id. 32 & n.3 (citing Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 & n.1
(2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring)).
96 90 F.2d at 1247 n.1. Citing a case that involved disqualification of an
ex-government attorney, Judge Mansfield pointed out the risk in that case that
confidential information acquired in government service might prejudice the outcome
of the trial.
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purely as a prophylactic measure designed to foster ethics in gov-
ernment.
Similarly, the Armstrong panel's observation that Nyquist was
"not at all concerned with the extent of a disqualification" 97 is
hard to fathom. One would think that Nyquist's admonition that
"courts should be quite hesitant to disqualify an attorney" 98 de-
mands more stringent adherence when the issue reaches beyond
disqualification of a single lawyer to the disqualification en masse
of every lawyer in a firm.
Judge Newman's two-variable test for firm disqualification is
likewise not without difficulty. Law firms are now instructed to
ask: "is the 'matter' for which the disqualified lawyer had 'substan-
tial responsibility' the kind of matter where the risks against which
DR 9-101 (B) guards are present?" 9 The short answer to this
question would seem to be-if it is not that "kind" of matter, then
the former government attorney should not be disqualified in the
first place, and the question of the firm's disqualification should not
even arise. This would-be variable is really a constant-in any
case in which a former government attorney is disqualified, his or
her firm would be too because the risks that Disciplinary Rule
9-101 (B) protects against would necessarily be present.
The court's attempt tb distinguish Kesselhaut carries this
illogic another step.100 To say that Kesselhaut involved no risk of
enhancing private employment is not to distinguish it, but only
to conjure up an issue that was not present in that case. The issue
actually litigated and decided in Kesselhaut was whether the ex-
government attorney's knowledge of the matter should be imputed
to the other members of his firm so as to disqualify them, the very
same issue that was litigated in and decided by the district court
in Armstrong.
The idea behind Armstrong's second proposed variable-
whether the former government attorney's involvement in the
matter was active and personal or merely formal and supervisory-
seems somewhat confused. This variable seemingly concerns two
distinct kinds of impropriety: (1) the danger that knowledge of
confidential information gained while in government service will
be used or disclosed; and (2) the danger that government employees
will manipulate the matters before them to enhance future job pros-
97 606 F.2d at 32 (emphasis in original).
98 590 F.2d at 1246.
99 606 F.2d at 33.
10o The Armstrong court, although not disapproving Kesselhaut, was careful to
express "no opinion on that result." Id.
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pects. Although it is readily apparent how the first danger increases
as a lawyer's participation in a matter becomes more active and
personal, that danger played no part in the Armstrong scenario, as
related by the trial court and confirmed by the court of appeals.101
Perhaps due to the lower court's finding of the lack of any such
disclosure, the circuit court occupied itself with the second danger.
Although the court seemed to think that formal, supervisory re-
sponsibility provides less opportunity for misuse of authority than
active, personal involvement, that proposition is by no means an
obvious one. On the contrary, one would expect that the higher
up an attorney is situated on the supervisory ladder, the greater
the power to manipulate. Active and personal involvement would
ordinarily correlate with a subordinate position having little au-
thority to misuse.
Despite Armstrong v. McAlpin's failures, one might still in-
quire whether the case was correctly decided. Altman's disquali-
fication was not contested, and the only issue confronting the court
was the firm's disqualification. Moreover, the court below had
decided, and the court of appeals did not disagree, that Altman's
special knowledge of the matter had not been shared with his col-
leagues in the Gordon firm. Did the danger that government
attorneys other than Altman might misuse their authority compel
disqualification of Altman's firm?
As a measure designed to deter government attorneys from
using their authority to curry favor with future employers, dis-
qualification of the Gordon firm in Armstrong because of Altman's
active and personal involvement in a substantially related matter
seems arbitrary and ineffective. Why disqualify the firm only in
substantially related cases? Surely a. firm knows when it hires a
government lawyer that he or she will be disqualified in any mat-
ters in which he or she was actively and personally involved, and
that in such cases, the firm, too, will run a high risk of disqualifica-
tion. If government attorneys are willing to misuse their authority
for private gain, it seems unlikely that they, or their future employ-
ers, will be deterred by the prospect of disqualification in a handful
of representations. The only effective way to use disqualification to
deter such misconduct would be to disqualify the firm in every case,
that is, to ban government lawyers from moving into private
practice.
The flimsiness of the deterrence rationale in Armstrong only
underscores the extent to which the court of appeals rested its de-
101 See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
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cision on the appearance-of-impropriety doctrine. Even though no
actual impropriety took place, and even though disqualification
could have but a miniscule deterrent effect on the future conduct
of government lawyers, nevertheless, the court seems to have felt
that the situation looked bad.
Disqualification is an excessive sanction for the appearance of a
concededly nonexistent impropriety. A court concerned with the
public's baseless perceptions of evil would be well-advised to follow
Nyquist's advice to proceed cautiously. The public, after all, might
be equally, if not more concerned, over the use of disqualification
as a litigation tactic resulting in hardships to innocent clients. In
Armstrong, for example, the Gordon firm was not disqualified
until three years after the complaint was filed. Moreover, if the
public were inclined to think about the effect of disqualification
on the government's ability to attract and retain competent pro-
fessionals, it might also be unwilling to give judges the authority
to enact into law their necessarily subjective appraisals of public
opinion. Such considerations highlight the wisdom of Nyquist's
teaching that the notion of "appearance of impropriety" is simply
too vaporous to support a disqualification order, especially when
,compared to the concrete effects disqualification has on the client,
the attorneys, the underlying litigation, and the judicial system. In
light of the weighty policies, articulated in Kesselhaut, Formal
Opinion 342, and elsewhere, against disqualification of the firms
of former government attorneys, the Armstrong panel's hypersen-
sitivity to ethical nuances must be rejected as unwarranted in the
disqualification context.
0 2
102 See, e.g., NYC BA. OPINION 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 REcoRD
552 (1976); Kaufman, supra note 13; Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the For-
mer Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025 (1977); Revolving Door Proposal,
supra note 36.
To allow disqualification based solely on the appearance of impropriety gives
to appellate review a broader scope than would otherwise be available. It is well
established that the district courts bear the primary responsibility for supervising
the members of their bars and that their findings are reversible only for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Armstrong, the facts as found by the district court showed no evidence of actual
impropriety, and reversal for abuse of discretion would have been difficult to justify.
That course would also have impugned the integrity of the attorneys involved, a
step which courts in general are understandably reluctant to take. Measuring the
acceptable level of improper appearances, however, lends itself to characterization
as a legal question, one judge being as capable as another to decide what is good
for the legal system. Thus the court of appeals in Armstrong was able to paint its
reversal of the district court as flowing from disagreement over the applicable legal
rule rather than from the lower court's abuse of discretion. Armstrong v. McAlpin,
606 F.2d 28, 34 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042
(Dec. 12, 1979).
[Vol. 128:677
CHINESE WALL DEFENSE
4. Successive Representations and Former Private Attorneys
To date, the attention of the bar and the courts in successive
representation cases raising questions of firm disqualification has
focused on the problem of the former government attorney. No
recent Chinese wall cases have been reported in which the disquali-
fied lawyer's contact with the matter in question grew out of his or
her former private employment. 03 In such a case, as in the former
government attorney cases, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D) would
appear to create an absolute bar to continued representation by the
firm. Yet here, too, there are persuasive reasons why a strict appli-
cation of the rule should be avoided.
Once it is admitted that a Chinese wall can rebut the presump-
tion of imputed knowledge in former government attorney cases, it
becomes difficult to insist that the presumption is irrebuttable when
the disqualified, attorney's previous employment was private and
not public. To hold fast to such a proposition would logically re-
quire a belief that privately employed attorneys are inherently
incapable of being effectively screened, as though they were less
trustworthy or more voluble than their ex-government counter-
parts. 1° If former government attorneys can be screened effec-
tively, it follows that former private attorneys can too.105
One might attempt to characterize the former government
attorney exception as a clash between ethical precepts and public
policy in which the government's practical need to hire qualified
lawyers prevails. According to this view, the presumption of im-
puted knowledge remains irrebuttable, but the strong public policy
favoring job mobility of ex-government attorneys overrides it. The
former government attorney cases could thus be seen as a narrow
and unique exception to the traditional firm-disqualification rule
and Disciplinary Rule 5-105 (D).
10 3 In W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn.), aft'd
per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962), the attorney representing Bassett in an
ongoing litigation against Cook joined a firm that had formerly represented Cook.
Although the firm built a Chinese wall around itself to allow the new attorney to
continue the representation, the court disqualified the attorney. Given these unusual
facts, it is not surprising that the court, in this early case, found the Chinese wall
defense inadequate. See text accompanying notes 156-65 infra.
104 Although Americans have traditionally held public servants in high regard,
it now appears all too clear that even Supreme Court law clerks lack immunity to
the temptations of gossip. See generally B. WooDwARm & S. AisTRoNG, Tim
BimarwN (1979).
105 There are, of course, policy considerations unique to government employ-
ment against which a wall may give little protection, such as the danger of the
misuse of authority by government attorneys. It is the contention of this Comment,
however, that such additional concerns do not in the ordinary case warrant dis-
qualification of the firm. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
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The former government attorney cases and the opinions of
the bar, however, indicate a contrary understanding. They recog-
nize that the presumption of imputed knowledge is rebuttable.
Moreover, these authorities cannot be said to favor a balancing
approach that would overlook the commission of ethical violations
out of an excessive concern for the government's personnel needs.
Rather, they correctly perceive the firm-disqualification rule as
serving a dual purpose: to prevent instances of actual impropriety
and also to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Only the first of
these may fairly be characterized as ethical; the second is more a
matter of public policy.'06 When no risk of actual impropriety is
present, and disqualification of the firm would function solely to
avoid improper appearances, it makes sense to take into account
other, countervailing public policies. Thus, the court in Kessel-
haut embarked on its discussion of policy considerations only after
noting that "truly unethical conduct has not taken place and the
matter is merely one of the superficial appearance of evil, which a
knowledge of the facts will dissipate." 107 And the ABA Ethics
Committee, in Formal Opinion 342, conditioned the approval of
screening procedures on the absence of any appearance of significant
impropriety. 08
The exception these authorities carve out from the firm-dis-
qualification rule, therefore, is not in principle capable of limita-
tion to former government attorney cases. Once it is recognized
that, like Canon 9, the firm-disqualification rule is in part a pro-
phylactic measure, not confined to protecting the underlying trial
against taint, then the specific public policy on which one relies
to defeat disqualification becomes less significant. The door is open
to consideration of policies other than those present in the former
government attorney cases.
The Second Circuit's landmark decision in Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.109 provides strong support
for this conclusion. Although none of the policies unique to the
former government attorney cases were present in Silver Chrysler,
the court of appeals thought another policy supported its decision:
"[t]he importance of not unnecessarily constricting the careers of
lawyers who started their practice of law at large firms simply on
106 See, e.g., Work Product, supra note 11, at 1617-19.
107 Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct CL 1977) (en bane).
108 ABA OPmIoN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 521 (1976).
See also NYC BAR OPinioN 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 REcopw 552 (1976).
But see Revolving Door Proposal, supra note 36, at 57.
109 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the basis of their former association." 110 Significantly, the presump-
tion of imputed knowledge was rebutted in Silver Chrysler even
though the attorney's former law firm had made no efforts to shield
him from gaining access to the confidences and secrets of its client.
To suggest that the presumption may be so casually defeated in the
Silver Chrysler context while maintaining that it is irrebuttable
when a law firm, cognizant that its procedures will be scrutinized
by a trial court, makes every effort to wall off its tainted members,
would be absurd.
Support for a pragmatic approach to firm disqualification is
brewing in the American Bar Association itself. In its latest draft
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Commission
on Evaluation of Professional Standards discards the irrebuttable
presumption of imputed knowledge in section 7.1 (b) (1) and favors
instead a case-by-case approach that turns on the existence of a
"significant risk" of disclosure or improper use of client con-
fidences.11' The Commission's accompanying comment recognizes
that courts have held the presumption of shared confidences to be
conclusive, but finds that presumption "unrealistic when the firms
are large or where the clients are represented only for limited pur-
poses." 112 Although the comment stops short of an explicit en-
dorsement of the Chinese wall defense, it may be described as an
invitation to try it; in the case of a lawyer having "access to the
files of only a limited number of clients" and participating "in dis-
cussion of the affairs of no other clients," it states that "in the
absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that
such a lawyer in fact is privy to the confidences of the clients he
has served but not those of other clients." 113 Factors cited as bear-
ing on the determination of the likelihood of actual access are the
lawyer's professional experience, the "division of actual respon-
110 Id. 754. Judge Weinstein's scholarly district court opinion in Silver Chrysler
found substantial antitrust implications in ethical restrictions on the job mobility of
young associates in large law firms. 370 F. Supp. at 591. Although the court of
appeals expressly took exception to those findings, 518 F.2d at 757 n.9, subsequent
developments in the case law appear to shed new light on the issue. See National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
The anticompetitive effects of the Code have been the subject of much recent
critical commentary. See, e.g., J. AUEnBAcH, UNEQuAL JusTIcE 40-73 (1976);
J. LIEBERmAN, Catsis AT 'rim BAn 68-106 (1978); Francis & Johnson, The Em-
peror's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAmE6r U. 221
(1977); Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of Professional
Standards, 57 N.C. L. Pnv. 559 (1979); Morgan, supra note 16.
ll MoDEL Rums, supra note 17, at § 7.1(b)(1).
112 Id. § 7.1, Comment, at 109.
113 Id. 110.
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sibility for the matters involved," the firm's organizational structure,
and the sensitivity and relevance of the information involved.114
In successive representation cases, the former government at-
torney exception, the Second Circuit's decisions in Nyquist and
Silver Chrysler, and the ABA Commission's discussion draft of the
Model Rules, suggest that the presumption of imputed knowledge
should be deemed rebuttable, whether the disqualified lawyer's
previous employment was private or public. Because that presump-
tion is rebuttable, the Chinese wall defense should be treated no
differently in former public than in former private attorney cases.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE WALLS
Whether courts should accept the Chinese wall defense as re-
butting the presumption of imputed knowledge depends, in part,
on an assessment of the effectiveness of screening procedures in
stemming the disclosure within a law firm of the confidences and
secrets of its clients. In part I, this Comment sought to examine,
in preliminary fashion, the types of ethical violations against which
Chinese walls might conceivably guard." 5 Part II surveyed the
developing case law on Chinese walls and related issues, and con-
cluded that existing precedents support acceptance of the Chinese
wall defense in successive representation cases." 6  To date, how-
ever, no court has undertaken to form an empirical estimate of the
effectiveness of walls. Even those courts that have condoned screen-
ing procedures have done so without considering whether walls are
deserving of respect. Although the probable effectiveness of a par-
ticular Chinese wall must be considered by a court on the facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case," 7 part III is addressed to the
more general inquiry whether Chinese walls can ever be sufficiently
effective to warrant judicial attention. Part III attempts this task,
114 Id. A separate section provides that no lawyer in a firm "may accept" a
representation that a former government attorney in the firm would be required to
decline, id. f1.11(e), a rule apparently grounded in the risk of misuse of govern-
mental authority. Id. Comment, at 37-38. Whether this section forecloses the
Chinese wall defense to law-firm disqualification in the former government lawyer
context is a matter of some difficulty. The use of the term "may" instead of "shall"
indicates an area "in which the lawyer acts according to professional discretion."
Id. Scope and Definitions, at 4. Furthermore, the ABA Commission's discussion
draft warns against use of the Model Rules as "procedural weapons" in nondiscipli-
nary proceedings, a caution which appears to include disqualification motions. Id. 5.
Thus, the Model Rules do not mandate a strict rule of law-firm disqualification in
former government attorney cases and could possibly be reconciled with the Nyquist
approach as interpreted in this Comment.
115 See text accompanying notes 16-41 supra.
116 See text accompanying notes 42-114 supra.
117 See text accompanying notes 156-65 infra.
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first by examining the use of Chinese walls in financial institutions
and then by comparing law-firm walls to their financial counterparts.
A. Chinese Walls in Financial Institutions
Securities firms and banks, plagued by conflict of interest prob-
lems analogous to those of law firms, routinely build Chinese walls
to protect their clients. 118 Given the legal profession's lack of ex-
perience with walls, the effectiveness of walling procedures in finan-
cial institutions merits examination.
Conflicts of interest arise in a securities firm because of its
multiple functions, as investment banker on the one hand and as
securities broker, dealer, and investment adviser on the other.1 19
In its capacity as investment banker, a securities firm has a duty to
guard the confidentiality of financial secrets it receives from its
customers. At the same time, however, the firm's broker-dealer or
investment advising department may be making recommendations
concerning the securities of these very same customers, and the in-
vestment management arm of the securities firm may be buying or
selling those securities for accounts it manages. 20 In the perform-
ance of these functions, the securities firm owes a conflicting duty
under rule 1Ob-5 to disclose inside information or to refrain from
using it in trading or recommending the securities in question.1'
Like their counterparts in securities firms, commercial-bank
employees also receive confidential information as investment bank-
ers, direct lenders, and board members.122 Because banks also buy
and sell securities, both on their own accounts and as trustees and
118 The experience of financial institutions with Chinese walls has engendered
extensive commentary. E.g., Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust
Department and the "Wall," 14 B.C. LNDus. & CoM. L. REv. 21 (1972); Herzel &
Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflicts of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73
(1978) (and sources cited therein at 75 n.1); Huck, The Fatal Lure of the "Im-
permeable Chinese Wall," 94 BANrmG L.J. 100 (1977); Hunsicker, Conflicts of
Interest, Economic Distortions, and the Separation of Trust and Commercial Banking
Functions, 50 S. CAr. L. REv. 611 (1977) (and sources cited therein at 634 n.126);
Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities
Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975) (and sources cited therein at 462 n.7);
M6ndez-Pefiate, The Bank "Chinese Wall": Resolving and Contending with Conflicts
of Duties, 93 BAssno L.J. 674 (1976); Yeilon, Trust Investments: Problems Regard-
ing Exchange of Information between the Trust Department and Other Departments
within the Bank, 54 CnL B. REc. 405 (1973); Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage
Firms, 88 Hanv. L. REv. 396 (1974).
119 Lipton & Mazur, supra note 118, at 464-70.
120 Id. 464-66.
121 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 976 (1969), 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Lipton & Mazur, supra note 118, at 465-66.
1 2 2 See Herman & Safanda, supra note 118, at 22-26; Herzel & Coiling, supra
note 118, at 75-80.
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investment managers, they encounter conflicts of interest substan-
tially identical to those faced by securities firms.123
To prevent such conflicts from arising, financial institutions
have developed structural, procedural, and educational methods for
containing confidential information. Structurally, separate financial
roles-investment banker, broker-dealer, trustee-have been assigned
to distinct groups of employees, and this division of labor is reflected
in discrete departments in almost every financial institution of
appreciable size. Recently, these internal structural arrangements
have even acquired legal status through incorporation, 1' a trend
one observer thinks may serve to reduce the probability of infor-
mation leaks by creating a heightened sense of corporate identity.l2
Organizational separation may be supplemented by physical
separation, 26 a practice intended to reduce the possibility that a
department, either accidentally or in deliberate violation of com-
pany policy, will gain access to prohibited information127 Physical
separation, like incorporation, is also thought to increase the sense
of departmental identity.1
2 8
123 See sources cited in note 122 supra.
Other banking conflicts of interest and legal problems arising from multiple
functions are described in Herzel & Colling, supra note 118, at 102-14; Hunsicker,
supra note 118, at 619-30. One possible conflict that need not arise from perform-
ance of multiple functions is related to a possible duty to refrain from aiding take-
overs of corporate borrowers. Whether such a duty exists and whether Chinese
walls can prevent such a conflict are current controversial topics. See generally
Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979), noted in Case
Comment, Bank Financing of Hostile Takeovers of Borrowers: Washington Steel
Corp. v. TW Corp., 93 H.Av. L. REv. 440 (1979); Bid for McGraw Raises Ques-
tions on Bank's Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1978, at D4, col 1; Court's Bar on
Chemical's Takeover Loan Holds Serious Implications for Big Banks, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 20, 1979, at 4, col. 2; see also As Charges Intensify, Strategy is Emerging in
McGraw-Hill Battle, id., Jan. 29, 1979, at 11, col. 6; 23, col. 3 (American Express
developing Chinese wall defense on behalf of its president, a director of the take-
over target, McGraw-Hill).
124 Since 1970, banks have taken advantage of the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, Title I, § 103(4), 84 Stat 1760
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976)), by spinning off or acquiring cor-
porations to perform functions not strictly part of commercial banking. See Hun-
sicker, supra note 118, at 615. Securities firms sometimes incorporate departments
possessing a great potential for conflict, such as trust divisions and firm-run mutual
funds. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 118, at 496.
125 See Hunsicker, supra note 118, at 618 n.32.
126 See Herzel & Colling, supra note 118, at 91. A few large banks have even
placed potentially conflicting departments in different buildings. Id.
127 See Hunsicker, supra note 118, at 615-16. But cf. Herzel & Coiling, supra
note 118, at 115 ("Separation is also a poor solution because the same problem
would remain in the separated trust department."). For other benefits of separa-
tion, see generally Hunsicker, supra note 118, at 614-19.
128 See Herman & Safanda, supra note 118, at 43 ('Tbysical separation and
profit center status reinforce the impetus toward autonomy.").
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Routine, internal procedures for the handling of confidential
information constitute another screening method prevalent in finan-
cial institutions. At the heart of these procedures is restricted ac-
cess to files. 29 Thus, banks typically attempt to prohibit access by
trust department personnel with investment responsibilities to files
containing commercial credit information,130 and securities firms
utilize equivalent procedures.' 31
A third ingredient in the construction of a Chinese wall is
educational in nature. Although outside sanctions may apply to
conduct that breaches a wall,132 some employees may not ade-
quately be acquainted with the relevant legal standards. And if the
firm's policy remains unspoken, even those employees who are more
knowledgeable may be led by their desires for self-advancement to
bend or break the law.133 Thus, a strong policy statement from the
management against passing information to other departments, ac-
companied by an educational program for employees, is considered
essential if a Chinese wall is to be even minimally effective. 34
Despite these measures, Chinese walls in financial institutions
have not been free from criticism. 3 5 In part, problems have arisen
from a failure to adopt, and when adopted to apply, adequate pro-
cedures. Some large banks, for example, were slow to establish
policies against transfer of information from their commercial bank-
ing to their trust departments. 30 Even when such policies were
announced, commercial credit files sometimes remained open to
trust department employees. 3 7 In other cases, the procedures were
adequate but were applied only to a small segment of the full range
of confidential information in need of protection. 38  Occasionally,
too, the wolves were left to guard the sheep: individuals who were
themselves subject to the rules bore the duty of enforcement and
performed the task of distinguishing protected from unprotected
information. 3 9
129 Herzel & Coiling, supra note 118, at 89.
130 Id. 91.
'31 Lipton & Mazur, supra note 118, at 466.
132 These sanctions include criminal penalties for violation of rule 10b-5
proscriptions on insider trading.
'33 See Hunsicker, supra note 118, at 643-44 & n.180.
'34 Herzel & Coiling, supra note 118, at 88-89.
135 See, e.g., Herman & Safanda, supra note 118; Note, supra note 118, at
412-13.
136 Herman & Safanda, supra note 118, at 39.
137 Id.
138 Id.
189 Id.
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Although such problems could be avoided by stricter observ-
ance of walling methods, walls in financial institutions have also
suffered from defects that may be irremediable. If the bank or firm
is small, so that the same employees perform diverse functions, a
wall may be impossible to build.1 40 Some mingling of functions
may be unavoidable even in large institutions when integrated
decisionmaking procedures increase the likelihood that confidential
information will be exchanged among higher-ups.1 41 Particular
kinds of transactions, such as a firm's investing for its own account
in securities concerning which it has acquired inside information,
may present temptations too great to resist. 42 And it may be that
structural, procedural, and educational methods all combined are
no match for the natural tendency of coworkers to talk shop at
company-wide social gatherings and in chance encounters. 43 At
any rate, studies of Chinese walls in financial institutions have found
frequent breaches. 44 Despite these drawbacks, the bulk of con-
sidered commentary on the problem endorses the Chinese wall as a
significant aid in solving the information conflicts of financial
institutions. 45
B. Financial Walls Compared to Law-Firm Walls
The experience of financial institutions with Chinese walls
indicates that walls are not impermeable barriers to information
flow. Although in some respects law-firm walls are similar, im-
portant differences exist. On balance, a comparison of financial
and law-firm walls suggests that Chinese walls in law firms will suc-
cessfully impede the flow of confidential information in successive
representation cases.
Similarities between financial institutions and law firms make
their walls comparable. Like employees of financial institutions,
individual lawyers in small law firms may perform potentially con-
flicting functions. 4 Large law firms typically have a departmental
140 Herzel & Coiling, supra note 118, at 91-92; Hunsicker, supra note 118, at
643.
141 Herman & Safanda, supra note 118, at 38.
142 Lipton & Mazur, supra note 118, at 499-510.
143 Herman & Safanda, supra note 118, 40-41.
144 See Hunsicker, supra note 118, at 645-46 & n.191.
145 See, e.g., Herzel & Colling, supra note 118; Lipton & Mazur, supra note
118; M6ndez-Pefiate, supra note 118.
146 For example, in a small firm lacking a departmental structure, a lawyer
serving as a trustee may also acquire inside information relating to trust holdings
or to publicly traded securities by virtue of his or her corporate law activities.
In a large firm, separate trust and corporate departments would render this
improbable.
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structure and branches in several locations.147 In large firms, how-
ever, as in large financial institutions, important decisions are often
made by committees whose membership cuts across organizational
lines. 148 Interdepartmental and interbranch transfers of personnel
are not uncommon in large firms, and some firms even require de-
partmental rotation by young associates. 149 Like financial institu-
tions, law firms recruit new business from other departments and
encourage firm unity at social gatherings attended by all the lawyers
associated with the firm. To the extent that the effectiveness of law-
firm walls depends upon a strict observance of the separation of
departments and branches, these similarities suggest that Chinese
walls in law firms will suffer the same defects as walls in financial
institutions.
Some of the differences between financial institutions and law
firms would appear to indicate that walls in law firms will be even
less reliable than their financial cousins. The information prob-
lems in financial institutions arise because different departments
offer different services, whereas in law firms information problems
may arise within a single department. Because these problems are
inherent when a multiplicity of services is provided, as in financial
institutions, financial walls are permanent. By contrast, law-firm
walls are typically created after a conflict arises; 'r0 they attempt to
screen a particular matter, rather than all matters handled by a par-
ticular employee or group of employees. The ad hoc and post hoc
nature of law-firm walls means that no barrier to the flow of con-
fidential information will be erected until the ethical problem is
discovered.
Despite these gloomy indicators, persuasive evidence supports
a sunnier forecast for the effectiveness of Chinese walls in successive
14 7 See generally Survey, supra note 1. For discussion of the structure and
organization of small and large firms, see E. Si=zEr., THE WALL STET LAwYE
171-248 (1964).
148 See, e.g., Baker & Botts, Firm Resume (Houston), 1979; Hughes, Hubbard
& Reed, Firm Resume (New York), July 1, 1979, at 2; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Firm Resume (Philadelphia), Fall, 1979, at 2. See generally E. SNscEL, supra
note 147, at 236-39, 244.
149 E.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Firm Resume (New York), Aug.,
1979, at 3 (eight-month rotation); Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Firm Resume
(Boston), Fall, 1979 (two-year rotation); Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen,
Firm Resume (Philadelphia), Sept., 1979, at 4 (one-year rotation). See generally
E. SmIGEL, supra note 147, at 239-43.
Firms with several branches may have rotation among branches. E.g., Ful-
bright & Jaworski, Firm Resume (Houston), June, 1978, at 2.
150 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Kesselhaut v. United States,
555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en bane).
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representation cases. First, the softness of departmental lines in
law firms would be relevant chiefly in concurrent representation
cases, in which separate teams of lawyers contemporaneously pur-
sue conflicting representations. But, as explained in part I above,151
in such cases the Canon 5 problems are likely to overshadow the
Canon 4 issues, and the Chinese wall defense has little chance of
defeating a disqualification. Moreover, studies that show the
permeability of financial walls are of questionable relevance to
legal walls in successive representation cases, because the conflicts in
financial institutions are mostly concurrent, and there is good rea-
son to believe that Chinese walls are more likely to be effective in
cases of successive rather than concurrent representation. 152
Second, the ad hoc nature of law-firm walls operates in suc-
cessive representation cases to create a greater, not a lesser, likeli-
hood of prevention. Unlike financial walls, law-firms are not used
to screen an entire department, but only the individual lawyer or
lawyers tainted by reason of their former representations. As the
number of people to be walled off grows smaller, the prospects for a
successful wall increase. Furthermore, because law firms erect walls
with the expectation that their procedures will be subjected to ju-
dicial scrutiny upon a motion for disqualification, strict adherence
to walling measures may be presumed. The attorneys whose ac-
tivities are responsible for the screening procedures can also count
on testifying under oath concerning their conduct and thus will
have every reason scrupulously to observe the wall. In contrast,
walls in financial institutions are standard operating procedure, and
outside scrutiny is likely to be infrequent.
The validity of the Chinese wall defense, however, does not
depend upon a showing that Chinese walls will never be breached.
The purpose of the defense-to rebut the presumption of imputed
knowledge-will be fulfilled if a Chinese wall is deemed probably
effective. Once the wall defense is sustained, a determination based
on the probable effectiveness of the wall given all the facts and
circumstances of the individual case,' 53 actual breaches can still be
proved by the party moving for disqualification. Returning the
burden of producing evidence to that party will not require it to
disclose the very secrets it wishes to protect; it should be enough,
for example, to show the mere occurrence of forbidden conversa-
tions, without demonstrating any prejudice resulting from their con-
-51 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
152 See text accompanying note 64 supra.
1
5 3 See part IV, comprising text accompanying notes 156-65 infra.
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tents. That such a burden is not excessive is demonstrated by Fund
of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.'54 and Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.15 In both cases the party seeking
disqualification established a breach in the Chinese wall. Viewed
in this light, the preceding comparison of walls in financial institu-
dons and in law firms establishes that, in general, law-firm walls in
successive representation cases have a likelihood of effectiveness
sufficient to oblige courts to give the Chinese wall defense serious
consideration.
IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHINESE WALL
DEFENSE IN PARTICULAR CASES
Although part III established the general effectiveness of
Chinese walls in successive representation cases, it is not suggested
that the Chinese wall defense is thereby entitled to recognition in
every case in which it is raised. A case-by-case approach is necessary
because the determination of the risk of disclosure or misuse of
client confidences is a factual one that will vary with the circum-
stances. In some cases, it may be that a court should reject the
defense as unlikely to be effective even though no actual breach
has been shown. To pose an extreme example: suppose that a
client X had long been represented by law firm A, which had at
the time ten lawyers. Dissatisfied with A's service, X finds new
counsel. One month later, firm A is retained by client Y to sue X
in a matter closely related to A's former representation of X. Al-
though it is clear given the history of A's relationship to X that all
ten lawyers who worked at firm A during that time would be dis-
qualified, A has since hired two new lawyers, neither of whom has
ever worked on matters relating to X. Having read the first three
parts of this Comment, firm A decides that it will not be disquali-
fied if it constructs a wall around the ten original lawyers and
entrusts the litigation to its two new attorneys. Everyone is in-
structed not to discuss the litigation with the new attorneys, but no
measures are taken to restrict access to the many files that have
accumulated over the years respecting X. In such a case, a court
would be justified in disqualifying firm A entirely, without requir-
ing X to prove any actual breach of the wall. The probability of a
breach is high, and the prejudice to the underlying case likely to
be great.
154 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977).
155 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cr.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
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No precise formula exists for determining when a wall should
be accepted. But a number of factors can be articulated that will
bear on that determination. Both the nature of the information
problem and the "architecture" of the wall will affect the likelihood
of a breach. In addition, the former will also determine the gravity
of the prejudice to the party moving for disqualification.
(1) The substantiality of the relationship: assuming that the
former and current "matters" are "substantially related" so as to
disqualify at least one attorney, the degree of substantiality will
influence the gravity of the potential prejudice involved and thus
figures in the decision whether to disqualify the firm. The more
closely related the matters are, the greater the possible prejudice. 156
(2) The time lapse between the matters: when the former rep-
resentation is a recent one, recollection of confidences and secrets
will be greater, files relating to the matter will more likely be
available, and the likelihood of a breach will be higher than if the
former representation took place in years gone by.
157
(3) The size of the firm: in small firms the presumption of im-
puted knowledge is more realistic than in large firms. 55
(4) The number of disqualified attorneys: when the attorneys
to be walled off are few, the likelihood of success is great; the fewer
the number of actual contacts, the smaller the opportunity for dis-
closure.
(5) The nature of the disqualified attorney's involvement: as-
suming that the tainted attorney's involvement is sufficient to dis-
qualify him or her, the extent of his or her knowledge may affect
the gravity of the prejudice. A junior associate who worked on
peripheral legal issues is less likely to be privy to potentially damag-
ing confidences and secrets than a senior partner heavily involved
in conducting the litigation. 59 Likewise, a government attorney
156 See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1975); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp.
265, 268-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
'57 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284,
1309-10 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub noma. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Liebman, supra note
9, at 1016.
158 See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Liebman, supra note 9, at
1017-18, 1036; Intra-Firm Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1068-70.
159 See, e.g., NCK Org'n v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976);
Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
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with merely formal or supervisory responsibility will probably lack
knowledge of the details of cases as compared with an attorney in-
volved on a day-to-day basis. 60
(6) The timing of the wall: a Chinese wall erected as soon as
the potential for disclosure or use of confidences arises has a better
chance of success than one created after the fact.
(7) The features of the wall: at a minimum, walls should pro-
hibit discussion of sensitive matters, limit the circulation of sensi-
tive documents, and restrict access to files.161 A strong firm policy
against breaching the wall with a threat of sanctions, measures to
prevent the disqualified attorneys from deriving any compensation
from the representation, and organizational, physical, and geo-
graphic separation are all ingredients that fortify a Chinese wall.162
In weighing those factors the question must always be-does the
Chinese wall reduce the potential for prejudicial misuse of con-
fidences and secrets to an acceptable level? In certain circumstances,
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975); Redd v. Shell Oil Co. [1974-2]
Trade Cas. f[75,392, at 98,278 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds,
518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.-v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975);
Liebman, supra note 9, at 1036.
160 See, e.g., Armstrong v. MeAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing
en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555
F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en bane).
161 See, e.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(en bane); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reved,
606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12,
1979).
162 See, e.g., ABA OpNwoN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517,
521 (1976); Herzel & Colling, supra note 118, at 88-91; Liebman, supra note 9,
at 1037; Revolving Door Proposal, supra note 36, at 56-58.
Of course, the factors listed in the text need not be the only ones a court uses
in considering the validity of a wall. Several authorities require or suggest that the
isolated attorney and members of the firm take oaths affirming the fact of isolation.
E.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.26(c) (2) (1978) (IRS post-employment regulations); see
NYC B"n OPIION 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 RPcoRD 552, 570 (1976);
Note, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 CEo. L.J. 1025,
1047-48 (1977). Another relevant factor might be the manner in which the firm
obtained the business. For instance, under SEC post-employment regulations, it
-will be considered significant that:
The firm had a preexisting securities law practice prior to the arrival
of the disqualified attorney;
The matter was previously the subject of consideration by the firm or
the client was already advised by the firm;
In cases where the matter or client became the subject of considera-
tion by the firm subsequent to the firm's employment of the lawyer indi-
vidually disqualified, that the matter was not brought to the firm because
of the disqualified attorney.
17 C.F.R. §200.735-8(e) (1979). See also 31 C.F.R. §§10.26(c)(1)(i), (ii)
(1978); NYC BA'n OPInaoN 889, supra note 36, reprinted in 31 REcoan 552, 570-71
(1976).
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nonethical considerations may come into play and lower the thresh-
old for the acceptance of Chinese walls. When the disqualified
lawyer is a former government attorney,163 or a young associate
incapacitated by his or her affiliation with a large law firm,164 public
policies surrounding the mobility of attorneys render firm disquali-
fication more undesirable than otherwise. If disqualification of the
firm would render effective representation unavailable as, for ex-
ample, when the "firm" is a legal aid office, Chinese walls should
receive more favorable treatment. 6 5 Surely other policies will be
found to exert a similar influence. In any particular instance the
question should be whether these countervailing policies are strong
enough in the circumstances of the case to render a higher risk of
prejudice acceptable.
V. CONCLUSION
Indiscriminate application of the firm-disqualification rule-a
rule fashioned in an era when law firms were small and intrafirm
relations informal-is no longer viable in the complex world of large
law firms. In particular, it is unrealistic to adhere to an irrebut-
table presumption that a lawyer shares the confidences and secrets
of a client with all the other lawyers in his firm. Although by no
means a panacea for the many ethical problems presented by con-
temporary legal practice, the Chinese wall defense in some cases
163 See, e.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. C]. 1977)
(en banc); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 360-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); ABA OPINioN 342, supra note 6, reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 (1976);
Kaufman, supra note 13.
164 See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co., 440 F. Supp.
193 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978); Intra-Firm Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1066-67.
165 See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 9, at 855-58; cf. Bonus Oil Co. v. American
Petrofina Co., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ir 60,315, at 66,267 (D. Neb. 1975) (placing
greater burden on party moving for disqualification would, in some cases, protect
"the access of smaller and less privileged economic units of our society to quality
legal representation without contributing to unwarranted breaches of client confi-
dences") (citing Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F.
Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975)).
In a recent opinion, the ABA decided to endorse screening to allow members
of boards of legal services programs and their firms to represent parties adverse to
those represented by program staff lawyers. ABA Commns. oN Enmcs & PRoFEs-
sioNAL REsPoNsmrry, OpINIONS, No. 345 (1979), reprinted in 65 A.B.A.J. 1558
(1979). The opinion recognized "the extreme value of having active practitioners
serve as board members," and "noted that in some smaller communities it is
impossible to secure qualified lawyer-members for boards who would not be involved
from time to time representing clients opposing persons represented by program
staff lawyers." Id. 1559. The committee concluded "that the compelling need for
resources, not the least of which is strong interest in legal services and participation
on program boards by active practitioners, to provide legal services for the indigent
outweighs the risk of any possible appearances of impropriety." Id.
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can rebut the presumption of imputed .knowledge and thereby save
a law firm from disqualification. Chinese walls should not be relied
upon in cases of concurrent representation, in which the conflict of
loyalties addressed by Canon 5 is paramount, but in successive repre-
sentation cases the Chinese wall defense offers protection from dis-
qualification of a law firm based on Canon 4 difficulties.
Applauded as a workable solution to conflicts in financial insti-
tutions, Chinese walls are capable, in general, of effectively prevent-
ing the disclosure and misuse of confidential information within law
firms. The success of the defense, however, will depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. This Comment has articulated
a number of factors to be considered when appraising a Chinese
wall, including (1) the substantiality of the relationship between
the former and current matters, (2) the time elapsing between the
matters, (3) the size of the firm, (4) the number of tainted attorneys,
(5) the nature of the disqualified attorney's involvement in the
former matter, (6) the speed with which the wall is erected, and (7)
the strength of the wall. In addition to these seven criteria, all
bearing on the risk of prejudicial disclosure or misuse, several ex-
trinsic policies may work to tip the balance against firm disqualifi-
cation. In the former government attorney cases, the government's
need for qualified lawyers must be considered. Concern for the
mobility of young attorneys will also be a factor militating against
disqualification.
Recognition of the Chinese wall defense thus offers a prac-
ticable solution to a growing problem of legal ethics. Without
detracting from the ethical standards of the legal profession, ex-
panded use of Chinese walls will help to remove artificial obstacles
to the job mobility of attorneys, private and public, while securing
to clients the maximum right to counsel of their choice.
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